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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
HOME ELECTRIC CORPORATION,
" corporation,
'
Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.
GEORGE R. RUSSELL and MRS.
r;EORGE R. RUSSELL, his wife,
Defedants-Respondents,
and
GEORGE R. RUSSELL and
RF.TTA 0. RUSSELL,
Third-Party PlaintiffsRespondents,
vs.
PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a California Corporation,

rt al.

No. 10382

Third Party Defendants and
Appellant.

KENNETH E. SMITH COMPANY,

a corporation,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
GEORGE R. RUSSELL and MRS.
GEORGE R. RUSSELL, his wife
Defendants-Respondents,
and
tiEORGE R. RUSSELL and
RETTA 0. RUSSELL,
Third Party Plaintif/sRespondents,
vs.
PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMP ANY, a California corporation, et al.
Third Party Defendant and
Appellant.

No. 10383

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Examination of the respondents' brief discloses
that the sole basis relied upon for affirming the rul1ng below lies in the language of No. 5 under paraPiaph three of the building loan agreement, viz.:

~

_5. $4,000. After house is completed a('

~ordmg to, plans. and specifications now on filr
m Lender s Off ice, ya rel has been graded ani'

all bills for mate1·ials and lab01· have been pair/
The respondents' argument is essentially that
the language of this clause binds the appellant a,;
well as the respondents. In determining the validitv
of this position, it would be well to review again th;.
meaning and purport of this clause, considered both
in light of its relationship to other provisions and
in the context of the loan agreement as a whole.
POINT I
THE SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS INCLUD·
ING THE PROVISION FOR FINAL PAYMENT
CONTAINED IN THE LOAN AGREEMENT
SERVED ONLY TO DEFINE THE RIGHTS OF
LENDER AND BORROWER WITH RESPECT
TO THE DUTY TO ADVANGE FUNDS ACCORD·
ING TO THE PROGRESS OF CONSTRUCTIOI\
IT DID NOT PURPORT TO ESTABLISH THI
RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES UPON DISBURSL
MENT OF THE MORTGAGE FUNDS.
In appellant's initial brief, it was shown tki.
the manner of disbursing funds provided for in tL,
loan agreement was the method usually employed;:
construction lending. This method clearly contr111·
plates that the borrower shall be entitled to ha 1"
the funds disbursed when the events specified in th<
agreement are met. In essence, then, the pro\'isi 1 m~
for disbursement contained in paragraph three estah·
lished the obligation of the lender to nd1 1m1a th·
mortgage funds.
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\\'holly apart from this aspect of the agreement
·111' othi>r prm·isions which govern the rights of the
part iPs upon clisbursemen t of the funds. Thus, in
1rnragraph two it is provided, inter alia, that the
h,nTO\\·ers ~ue to remit to the lender such other
:llllounts as may be required from time to time "to
assure full payment for (the) improvements." This
language obviously contemplates a situation where
adual job cost might exceed the contract price, and
rrquires the borrower to make good the excess, notwithstanding any previous disbursement of funds.
Also in paragraph three - the language on
which respondents predicate their entire case - it
!s provided that lender may disburse funds to any
"... contractor" without liability for so doing. And
in the rider attached to the agreement, it is expressly
provided: "Lender in its sole discretion may from
time to time make any or all such disbursements
without the occurrence of any or all conditions thereto. . . . "

POINT II
VIE\VING THE LOAN AGREEMENT AS A
\\'JIOLE, IT IS CLEAR THAT PARAGRAPH
THHEE \VAS NOT INTENDED TO DICTATE
THE EXCLUSIVE MANNER OF DISBURSE~IENT BY THE APPELLANT; BUT RATHER
THAT APPELLANT'S RIGHTS WITH REGARD
TO DISBURSEMENT WERE GOVERNED BY
IJTHER PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT
FULLY SUPPORTING THE ACTUAL PAY\IF\T OF FUNDS MADE BY APPELLANT.
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It is apparent that respondents' position can~
upheld only if the above mentioned parts - and in.
deed very material parts - of the loan agreement
are ignored. For, in substance, the respondents' con.
tention is simply that the obligation of the appellant
to disburse, as contained in paragraph three, must
dictate its own mode of disbursement should it choose
to pay funds directly to parties designated in the
agreement.* Under respondents' interpretation,
therefore, the provisions noted above which directly
control disbursement procedure are mere surplusage, since they are so patently at variance with the
position contended for by respondents.

However, it is clear the courts do not interpret
contracts by ignoring material clauses and provisions, but will, rather, consider all parts of the instrument in their endeavor to apply a reasonable
construction thereto. (Cornwall v. Willow Creek
Country Club, 13 U. 2d 160.) 369 P 2<l 928, As stated
in Gates v. Daines, 3 U. 2d 95, 279 P 2d 458.
The court may construe the contract oniY
as to give effect to the entire agreement with·
out ignoring any part thereof.
*We point out the fact that respondents are able to cite only o~e
case in support of their contention, viz., Holand v. Brown, 15 U. 2d
422. This decision adds nothing insofar as the instant controvers),
is concerned, for it s~mply states that inse;ted material will preha 1;
over the printed port10ns of a contract. This, of course assumes .t 3·
some inconsistency or contradiction exists between the w.y.1~ter
and printed portio~s ?f the contract. Corbin, Contracts § 548. e~
is no such contradiction here; paragra\lh. thre~ and subpara~r~;t~
the;euf!-der rel~te only to t~e events ~vmg rise ~o the appe ·~~ 1 ;
obhgation to disburse; the rights relating to .the. disbursement 1f;11 ,,
are covered elsewhere in the agreement, as 1s d1s<'ussed more
in the body of the present brief.
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It is true also that

. . . construction (is) preferred which
will harmonize all provisions of the writings ....
Here, it is apparent the conditions contained
in paragraph three were intended only to define the
erents which had to occur before the appellant was
obligated to disburse funds; the appellant then had
the option of paying the borrowers directly or of
disbursing the funds directly to any one or all of
the parties specified, including the general contractor. In the event the latter method were adopted, the
parties expressly agreed the appellant should have
the right to pay the funds as it might in its discretion deem proper, such right clearly not subject to
but in fact wholly exclusive of the conditions qualifying its obligation to disburse in the first instance.
CONCLUSION
The end result is that the appellant did disburse the funds in accordance with terms of the loan
agreement, and no evidence whatever has been adduced to show that such funds were not actually used
for construction purposes.
Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, BACKMAN &
CLARK
1111 Deseret Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant

